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Democracy without Secularism? 
Reflections on the Idea of Islamic Democracy 
Raja Bahlul 
"Democracy" has become a battle cry in political debates within Arab-Islamic 
societies.' Variously interpreted and understood, it has nevertheless come to 
represent an ideal that most political movements, even some that identify 
themselves as Islamic, claim as their own. 
What do contemporary lsla~nic thinkers understand by the term democ- 
racy? How do they deal with arguments purporting to prove that democracy 
requires secularism? Do they end up subverting the meaning of democracy, 
or do they succeed in offering an innovative and coherent understanding of 
what the term means, a vision of politics in which political and religious 
elements coexist peacefully? 
To examine Islamic approaches to democracy is in part to see how Islam 
views the "other." In the present case, this other is a victorious, democratic 
West that claims that, despite its faults, democracy is the only morally defen- 
sible political order, the only political optiou for societies and states that do 
not want to be left behind in the rapidly evolving world in which we live. 
There are at least two reasons why it is useful to explore how Islamic 
thiukers view democracy. To begin with, there is a purely theoretical interest 
in seeing how intellectual traditions (or cultures) perceive each other. In 
particular, what happens to concepts and practices emanating from a given 
intellectual tradition when attempts are made to graft them onto other intel- 
lectual traditions? Here we can find a measure of perceived distance between 
traditions and their ability (or inability) to recognize in each other an inter- 
locutor from whom to learu. 
Second, and perhaps more important, there is apractical interest iu seeing 
the possible form(s) that political practice may assume in countries where 
Islam is dominant or increasiugly iufluential. For example, are there signifi- 
cant differences between Islamic movements that pledge allegiance to de- 
mocracy and those that are consciously opposed to it? Better ur~derstanding 
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the conceptions and ideas espoused by prodemocracy Islamic thinkers can 
help us to anticipate the future and perhaps play a part in shaping its evolv- 
ing contours. 
The first section of this chapter centers on an explanation of certain as- 
pects of the "received view of democracy." According to this view, both in 
Western and Arab-Islamic countries, democracy presupposes (or implies) 
secularism. Western thinkers, long accustomed to the notion of the separa- 
tion between religion and the state, tend to presuppose this as part of the 
intellectual background of discussion. But prodemocracy Arab thinkers 
opposed to political Islam are acutely aware of the need to convince their 
readers that no genuine democracy is possible unless religion is relegated to 
the private sphere. All of this is part of the charged intellectual setting in 
which Islarnic thinkers must contest democracy for Islam or engage in its 
advocacy. 
The chapter's second section seeks to explain the Islamic perspective on 
democracy. "Islamic democrats" conceptualize democracy as a set of proce- 
dures for arriving at political decisions. Moreover, Islamic thinkers view 
these procedures as basically value free, which is to say they are neutral 
between different value systems-including Islamic and secularist values or 
ways of life. 
Finally, the last two sections of the chapter explore a number of objec- 
tions raised in conjunction with the proposed Islamic view of democracy. 
Such doubts and misgivings about "Islamic democracy" seek to underscore, 
by means of specific examples and scenarios, the extreme tension if not 
explicit contradiction seemingly unavoidable between the requirements of 
democracy and the requirements of the faith. Islamic replies, on the other 
hand, try to downplay the degree of such tensions, or to show that they are 
neither inevitable nor peculiar to the Islamic polity. 
Secularism and the ReceivedView of Democracy 
In the history of ideas, the rich complex concept of democracy has a long 
course of development during which associations were formed and links to 
other concepts forged. Consequently, it is not surprising to find that some of 
the more astute Islamic thinkers who have discovered the concept in recent 
years do not believe that "democracy" expresses a simple monolithic mean- 
ing that must either be accepted or rejected. 
Islamic thinkers are fully justified in this attitude, as suggested by the 
multitude of differing schools of democratic thought, ranging from liberal 
democracy, social democracy, and participatory democracy to deliberative 
democracy, in addition to concepts such as elite pacts, pluralism, polyarchy, 
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and others. The existence of different schools of thought, each of which 
claims to offer a mote adequate and perhaps more insightfnl view of democ- 
racy than its rivals, makes it evident that democracy is an "essentially con- 
tested concept."l Islamic writers who discuss democracy have in effect de- 
cided to join the debates on democratic discourse and its central disputed 
concept, striving to contest or win democracy for Islam. 
On the face of it, their task is not an easy one. For despite all the disagree- 
ments betweeu proponents of democracy, Western and uon-Western alike, 
and the differences between the various explications of the term, contempo- 
rary discussions of democracy commonly assume that religion is firmly 
within the private sphere and that the public sphere, where political activity 
takes place, is open to all citizens, without reference to religious convictious. 
Indeed, sometimes the need for citizens to meet on neutral, nonparochial 
ground is advanced as a requirement or presupposition that all but betrays 
the democratic-cum-secular form of the desired political order. The theorist 
John Rawls is a case in point, suggesting "political liberalism" as a possible 
answer to the questiou: "How is it possible that there may exist over time a 
stable aud just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by rea- 
sonable, though incompatible, religious, philosophical, and moral doc- 
triues?" (Rawls 1993: xx). 
More often, however, it is simply assumed that political debates and argu- 
ments that are to be conducted in the public arena, in the presence of all 
interested citizens, will use what Audi calls "secular rationale." Secular 
ratiouale is defined as one whose "normative force, i.e., its sratus as a 
prima facie justificatory element, does uot evidentially depend on the ex- 
istence of God (or denying it) or on theological considerations, or on the 
pronouucements of a person or institution qua religious authority" (Audi 
1997: 26). 
On the whole, it seems fair to say that what to do with religion is not 
considered to be a major problem in discussions of democracy in the West. 
Most of the time debates revolve around issues such as representation, fair- 
ness, equality, and participation that put religion somewhat aside. But wheu 
democracy is discussed in the context of Arab and Islamic culture, that is not 
the case: numerous writers remind us of the need to resolve the issue of the 
relation between religion and politics. The resolution most commonly sug- 
gested requires a separation between religion and politics. Democracy, we 
are told, requires secularism. 
For hziz al-Azmeh, one of the most prolific and insightful writers on 
political Islam, it is virtually axiomatic that democracy implies secularism. 
This is evident in the way he bemoans how rare in recent Arab de~nocratist 
discourse are "positions that underline the necessity of secularism for any 
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democratic order" (al-Azmeh 1994: 127). Elie Kedourie, a firm believer in 
the hostility of Arab-Islamic culture to democracy, claims that the idea of the 
secularity of the state (a concept "indispensable to good government and a 
free society") is "implicit in popular sovereignty" (Kedourie 1994: 5). Given 
that popular sovereignty is implied by democracy (its etymon underscores 
rule hy the demos), it would seem, according to this argument, that secular- 
ism is implied by democracy. 
Still a third, Azmi Bishara, appears to infer secularism from the very 
definition of democracy. According to Bishara, "It is conceptually impos- 
sible to entertain a notion of the freedom of thought and expression unless 
beliefs are placed in the realm of free decision. Freedom to decide, on the 
other hand, is (by definition) an individual liberty. Thns, if freedom of 
thonght and expression is an essential constituent of democracy, it follows 
that secularism. . . is an essential constituent of democracy'' (Bishara 1993: 
78).3 
This perceived nexus between democracy and secularism, eiudable or 
not, has not heen lost on Islamic writers seeking to  come to terms with the 
notion of democracy. The constellation of concepts they grapple with in- 
cludes not only democracy-related concepts such as the people, popular will, 
and the common good, but also divine sovereignty, obedience to God's law, 
and an entire system of moral and aesthetic values that derive from history 
and religion. 
Having seen for themselves the effects, both short and long term, of des- 
potism, and having witnessed, often at close quarters, the well-ordered 
workings of the polity in stable Western democracies, many Islamic thinkers 
have begun to yearn for a political order that would in some ways emulate 
what they observe in the West, without forsaking the living faith of the 
people. The challenge for them is to decipher the basic components and 
aspects of this "democratic" method of government, trying to determine 
how the system functions, what its presuppositions are, and whether and to 
what extent it can be emulated without doing harm to Islamic religion and 
culture. 
This does not promise to  be an easy task, inasmuch as it involves resolving 
some apparently serious conflicts between religion and democracy. One 
major problem, hinted at by Kedourie above, is recognizing the ptinciple of 
popular sovereignty. How can a religion-hased political system avoid setting 
up an office of "religious guardians" with veto power over the will of the 
people? Another problem area is freedom of thought and expression, re- 
ferred to by Bishara above. This raises a futther question: can the need to 
preserve a measure of orthodoxy (a hallmark of all religious traditions) be 
reconciled with freedom of thought and expression? Is that indeed compat- 
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ible with the spirit of toleration, presumed an essential part of democratic 
practice and ethos? 
An IslamicView of Democracy 
Islamic views on democracy are usefully introduced by reference to the writ- 
ings of three %,ell-known Islanlic thinkers: al-Ghannouchi, Turabi, and Kha- 
tami. Their views are not universally well received: secularists contend "Is- 
lamic democracy" is not sufficiently democratic, while conservative Islamic 
writers argue that "Islamic democracy" is not sufficiently Islamic. Neverthe- 
less, many find the moderate and reformist views of these three theorists 
both reasonable and appealing. Considered as a whole, their work repre- 
sents a quite elaborate attempt to come to grips with the fundamental ques- 
tions that Islamic thought must face if it is to succeed in arriving at a satisfac- 
tory and amicable settlement with democracy. 
Their logical move is to distinguish between two ways of thinking about 
democracy. One is to view democracy as basically a "doctrine of proce- 
dure," a method for dispensing, sharing, and managing political power. This 
view of democratic practice has been classically expressed by Schumpeter: 
"Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institu- 
tional arrangement for arriving at political . . . decisions, and hence inca- 
pable of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will produce 
under given historical conditions" (Schumpeter 1976: 242). 
This procedural conception of democracy is broad enough to include 
Dahl's "institutions of polyarchy," that is, free, periodic elections, inclusive 
suffrage, associational autonomy, and the like (Dahl 1989: 221). Basically, 
democracy is a method of government that allows the people to choose their 
rulers and hold them accountable for what they do in office. The other way 
is to view democracy as a procedure tied to values and philosophical beliefs 
that hinge on a certain conception of the "good life," a life that involves, 
among other things, autonomy, individuality. and free choice-a life lived in 
dignity within a political community. 
Both Schumpeter and, more recently. Rawls reject this view of democracy, 
though for different reasons. According to what Schumpeter terms the "clas- 
sical theory of democracy," democracy is an institutional arrangement that 
aims at achieving "the common good" (Schumpeter 1976: 250). Moreover, 
this view of democracy has certain religious moorings, in that the belief in 
the intrinsic and equal worth of all individuals (expressed in some state- 
ments of the classical theory of democracy) is basically a political translation 
of the Christian belief in the equality of all souls before God (Schumpeter 
1976: 266). 
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Rawls, on the other hand, distinguishes between liberalism viewed as a 
"comprehensive philosophical doctrine" and libetalism viewed as a solution 
to the problem of how citizens who are divided by "incompatible teligious, 
philosophical, and motal doctrines" can nonetheless manage to live to- 
gether. This latter Rawls terms "political liberalism," illustrating the differ- 
ence between these two views of liberalism by reference to the value of 
individual autonomy: "This value may take a t  least two forms. One is politi- 
cal autonomy, the legal independence and assured political integrity of citi- 
zens and their sharing with other citizeus in the exercise of political power. 
The other form is moral autonomy expressed in a certain mode of life and 
rcflection that critically examines our deepest ends aud ideals, as in Mill's 
ideal of iudividuality, or by following as best one can Kant's doctrine of 
autonomy. . . .Many citizens of faith reject moral autonomy as part of their 
way of life" (Rawls 1993: xliv-xlv).' 
The distinctions Islamic thiukers draw between differeut perspectives on 
democracy are markedly similar to those made by Schulnpeter and Rawls, 
despite the fact that they differ in details and manner of illustration. Al- 
Ghannouchi has put forward the clearest formulatiou of the distinction be- 
tween two ways of viewing democracy: 
It is possible for the mechauisms of democracy. . . to  operate in differ- 
ent cultnral milieus . . . Secularism, nationalism, profit-making, plea- 
sure, power, and the deification of man (these ate the values and prac- 
tices under whose shadow democracy developed) are not inevitable 
consequences of democracy. Democracy resolves itself into popular 
sovereignty, equality betweru citizens, governing bodies which emerge 
from popular will through free elections, . . . recognitiou of the 
majority's right to rule . . . There is nothing in these procedures which 
is necessarily in conflict with Islamic values. On the contrary, the 
democratic apparatus is the best available method for realizing these 
values. (al-Ghannouchi 1993: 88) 
Khatami provides a differeut formulat~on: "Democracy is a method of 
achieving [political] stability. This means that democracy is a mechanism, 
aud that the form of government is to be decided by the popular will. Now, 
in the West, popular will has led to secularism and liberalism. In Islamic 
societies, popular will is bound to produce a form of government which is iu 
line with people's Islan~ic thought" (Khatami 1998: 103). 
Statements by al-Ghannouchi, Khatami, and others make clear that to 
the Muslim way of thinking, democracy has become entangled with certain 
values and practices that Islam cannot permit. Primary among those ques- 
tioned values and practices is secularism. Materialism, utilitarianism, skep- 
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ticism, and liberalism (in the sense of "unfettered freedom") are also some- 
how intertwined with democracy. 
The conceptually innovative move that al-Ghannouchi and Khatami 
make lies in their claim that democracy as such is only contingently related 
to the abhorred secular values and practices. For Khatami, democracy is 
simply the practice of abiding by decisions of the popular will. If people's 
beliefs and values are Islamic, then by following the democratic method, we 
are bound to establish an Islamic regime. If, on the other hand, those popu- 
lar beliefs and values are secular or liberal, then pursuing that same method 
will naturally lead to the establishment of a secular or liberal regime. 
Al-Ghannouchi is even clearer: democracy means popular sovereignty, 
political equality, representative government, and majority rule. None of 
these necessarily entails secularism, skepticism, materialism, or util~tarian- 
ism. Hence there is no necessity. from an Islamic point of view, to reject 
democracy. Or, as Schumpeter phrases it, democracy is simply a method of 
making political decisions. It does not dictate the content of the decisions.' 
Believing that in a Muslim society the overwhelming majority will want 
to live in an Islamic way, Khatami and al-Ghannouchi welcome free elec- 
tions. Their attitude toward political pluralism. party competition, parlia- 
mentary debates, and other aspects of the democratic process is equally open 
and positive. For they imagine that all the competition, opposition, and 
debate will take place within specified limitsestablished by a national consen- 
sus on the essentials of the (Islamic) regime, so that no threat to the integrity 
of the Islamic society will be posed by these political processes and procedures. 
That pluralism and opposition take place within the framework of a last- 
ing fundamental political consensus on essential matters is not an original 
insight on the part of Islamic writers who have been engaged in examining 
the presuppositions of democracy. Many Western political writers recognize 
this. According to Esposito and Voll: "In standard modern Western political 
thought, acceptable opposition in a democratic system is closely tied to the 
concept of a constitutional government, in which there is an underlying, 
fundamental consensus on the 'rules of the game' of politics. Opposition is 
the legitimate disagreement with particular policies of specific leaders within 
the mutually accepted framework of the principles of an underlying consti- 
tution that is either written or based on long-established practice" (Esposito 
and Voll 1996: 36). 
Islamic thinkers agree with Esposito and Voll in thinking that democratic 
practice takes place "within the mutually accepted framework of the prin- 
ciples of an nnderlying constitution." In the case of the Islamic thinkers, 
though, the constitution derives from the basic principles of the faith. Is- 
lamic thinkers consider shari'a (Islamic law) to be that ioundation stone. 
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Turab~, for example, views shari'a as "the higher law, just like the constitu- 
tion, except that it is a detailed constitution" (1993: 25). Mawdudi, on the 
other hand, speaks of an "unwritten Islamic constitution," one that already 
exists, awaiting efforts to codify it, on the basis of its original sources. The 
sources for this unwritten constitution turn out to be identical with the 
sources of shari'a (Mawdudi 1975: 11). 
Once the binding Islamic constitutional framework is established, politi- 
cal activity can proceed in the familiar democratic manner, allowing for 
pluralism, opposition, and power contestation. To Turabi, this is a clear 
feature in Western democracies, exemplified in the logic of "government and 
loyal opposition": 
Such a consensus on the foundations, which is directly agreed upon, 
and in whose light details are discussed, is a condition for the stability 
of all democratic systems. This is how Western democracies have 
achieved their stability: the people, through a process of cultural and 
political development, have eventually reached a consensus on the 
foundations, and have succeeded in delimiting the matters which are 
subject to consultat~on and parliamentary debate. . . . If we were to 
look at partisan debates in Western democratic countries, we would 
find that the debate takes place within an established framework. For 
example, the difference between the Labor Party and the Conservative 
Party in Britain is very limited, and so is the difference between the 
Republican Party and the Democratic Party in America. (Turabi 1987: 
68) 
In a nutshell, this is the lsla~nic perspective on democracy. Democracy 
must be distinguished from secularism and other "ideological" value-ele- 
ments with which it has become extraneously entangled in Western practice. 
lslamic thinkers propose a mode of democracy without or beyond secular- 
ism. Freed from secularism, democracy becomes available as a means for 
Muslim societies to order their political life. 
Still, many key questions remain regarding the logical coherence of the 
resulting proposal, most centering on "rights." What types of r~ghts does the 
Islamic constitution recognize and protect? Does it  legitimize any form of 
discrimination between citizens? Does it protect the right of opposition and 
dissent, and to what degree? How does the minority fare within an Islamic 
polity? But perhaps we should begin by considering the fundamental ques- 
tion whose answer sets theocratic forms of government apart from modern 
democratic forms. This is the question of popular sovereignty: the collective 
right that people have to govern themselves by laws of their own making. Is 
this something that a religion-based system of government can accept? 
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People versus God:The Question of Sovereignty 
Islamic thinkers who want to come to terms with democracy often face a 
major conceptual difficulty at the outset, summarized as follows: On the one 
hand, democracy requires the upholding of a principle of popular sover- 
eignty. Islam, on the other hand, seems to  require repudiation of popular 
sovereignty in favor of an institution sometimes referred to  as "divine sover- 
eignty" or "divine rulership" (al-hakinziyya al-ilahiyyah). According to  
Sayyid Qutb, a well-known exponent of this idea: "The right of rulership 
gives rise to the right to legislate to people, the right to prescribe the way of 
life which people lead, the right to institute the values which this life is to be 
based on. . . . Whoever claims for himself the right to legislate a way of life 
for a people thereby claims divine authority over them, for he seeks to ap- 
propriate the most important attribute of divinity. Moreover, whoever 
amongst the people accepts this claim has thereby agreed to  make this per- 
son a God in place of the true God, for he attributes to  him the most impor- 
tant attributes of divinity" (quoted in Abu Zaid 1994: 105). This is often 
understood as illustrating the profound difference between Islam and its 
Western-secularist "other." With the two sides speaking such different lan- 
guages, what hope can there be for a real dialogue, much less mutual under- 
standing. to take place? 
How can advocates of Islamic democracy reply to  this charge? Initially, 
it should be madeclear that Islamic thinkers who speak of divine sovereignty 
do not usually mean to imply that the lslamic state, unlike other mundane 
states, has an "invisible president" who rules as mundane potentates do. 
Sayyid Qutb's statement notwithstanding, God does not rule over the affairs 
of the Muslim community as human rulers do. As al-Ghannouchi puts it, 
"Those who uphold the slogan 'Sovereignty belongs to God' do not mean 
that an Incarnate God comes to dwell amongst us in order to rule over us. 
God-may His Name be exalted-iannot be seen, nor does He dwell in a 
person or an institution that can speak for Him. The slogan 'Sovereignty 
belongs to God' means only 'lawful rule"' (al-Ghannouchi 1999: 155). 
Building on al-Ghannouchi's suggestion, one can argue that statements 
such as "Sovereignty belongs to God" or "In au Islamic state only God 
rules" should be construed as referring to what political decisions ought to 
be like if they are to have validity or moral r ec t i t~de .~  The ideal situation is 
when democratic procedures function within parameters set by divine law. 
People debate, discuss, and vote. And there is always a way to determine 
whether the decision was valid: not by the fact that it was accepted by the 
majority, after discussion and debate, but by checking it against divine law. 
To view Islamic calls for divine sovereignty and the application of shari'a 
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as hinting at the idea of "rule of (divine) law," constitutionalism, or an 
Islamic version of these is not some sort of wishfnl thinking to interpret 
Islam in a sympathetic light. This is grasped by more astute Arab secularists, 
such as Azmi Bishara, who claims that "in times when social consciousness 
takes a religious form, it is possible that calls for the application of shari'a 
express a democratic tendency, or (at least) an opposition to despotism, 
simply because shari'a rule implies restrictions on the exercise of political 
power over and above mere will of rulers" (Bishara 1993: 83). 
This remark, as well as similar statements by Tariq al-Bishri and Nazih 
Ayy~bi,~suggest that we should view advocacy of divine sovereignty as a 
way of referring to the constitutional framework within which the demo- 
cratic process is to take place, and which is the final arbiter in matters of 
political validity. This is fully compatible with the Islamic conception of 
democracy. After all, all democratic procedures, inclnding those in a liheral- 
secular framework, require an established constitution whose validity is not 
put to question every time the people go to the polls. In the case of Islamic 
democracy, the constitutional framework is none other than divine law, 
which people accept and which is the basis of their consensus. 
Still, many difficult qnestions abont the Islamic rule of law, the lslamic 
constitution, can he raised, pertaining in part to  the content of the Islamic 
law and how it may (adversely) affect the freedoms and the rights o t  minori- 
ties and other specific groups, such as women and non-Muslims. The next 
section will examine how Islamic writers may deal with questions of this 
kind. But first we turn to the relation between popular sovereignty and the 
Islamic rule of law (our basis for explicating the notion of divine sover- 
eignty). 
It may be thought that the notion of divine sovereignty, even when taken 
to mean rule of law, still poses a threat to popular sovereignty. After all, who 
is to be entrusted with codifying the unwritten Islamic constitution of which 
Mawdudi speaks? And who is to have a role in interpreting it? Surely not 
everyone, regardless of religious qualification. The concern here is well ex- 
pressed by the Egyptian thinker Nasr H a m ~ d  Abu-Zaid, who fears that di- 
vine sovereignty will easily dissolve into "the sovereignty of the fuqaha' 
[lslamic jurisprudents]" (Abu-Zaid 1994: 111, 117). 
Abu-Zaid's tears seem to have come true in the constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (Blaustein and Flanz 1986). 'This constitution probably 
represents the first attempt to write a detailed, workable constitution from 
an lslamic point of view. It is instructive to look at some of the relevant 
articles of the constitution: 
All civil, penal, financial, administrative, cultural, military, political 
laws and regulations, as well as other laws or regulations, should be 
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based on Islamic principles. This principle will in general prevail over 
all of the principles of the constitution, and other laws and regulations 
as well. Any judgment in regard to this will be made by the clerical 
members of the Council of Guardians. (Article 4) 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly cannot enact laws contrary to the 
rrsul [fundamentals] and ahkan: [judgments] of the official religion of 
thecountry or to the Constitution. It is the duty of the Guardian Coun- 
cil to determine whether a violation has occurred in accordance with 
Article 96. (Article 72) 
The determination of compatibility of the legislation passed by the 
Islamic Cousultative Assembly with the laws of Islam rests with the 
majority vote ofthe fuqaha' of the Guardian Coun~.il; and the determi- 
nation of its compatibility with the Constitution rests with the major- 
ity of all the members of the Guardian Council. (Article 96) 
The Guardian Council is not a popularly elected body. The clerical mem- 
bers, six in number, are appointed by the religious Leader, while another six 
are nominated by the head of the judiciary, who is also appointed by the 
Leader. This prompts Mayer to observe: "In consequence, not even constitu- 
tional rights guarantees can have force should the clerics . . . decide that 
those guarantees are not based on Islamic principles" (Mayer 1991: 37). 
Surely this cannot be squared with the basic principle of democracy, which 
gives people (or their duly elected representatives) power to pass legislation. 
If any agency has veto power over the decisions of the legislative council, 
which represents the people, how can one possihly speak of "popular sover- 
eignty," much less of democracy? 
There are several considerations that Islamic thinkers can underscore 
here to lessen if not altogether remove the alleged danger posed to democ- 
racy by the intrusion of religion. First, with reference to the origination, 
authorship, or codification of the constitution that regulates political life in 
society, it is rarely if ever the case that the multitude of the people, in their 
millions or hundreds of thousands, participate in laying down the founda- 
tions of the constitution. More often than not, coustitutions have "fathers" 
who are usually distinguished members of the community, prominent fig- 
ures who assume a position of leadership. Typically a "people's assembly" or 
a plebiscite gives a stamp of approval to principles and procedures that have 
already developed and matured in the guiding hands of the few, the ruling 
elites. In Islamic history, this class is referred to as ah1 a/-ha1 U,N a/-'aqd 
(those who "loosen and bind"). They include persons knowledgeable in 
religion, and others as well. If they were to play a dominant role in putting 
together the constitution according to which the nation lives, this would in 
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no way be inconsiste~~t with the historical practice of elites elsewhere in 
drafting constitutions. 
Second, even if we assume that people (as a multitude) participate in the 
creation of their constitution (that is, even if we assume that political elites 
do not play a major role in politics), that still does not mean that constitu- 
tions are always based on the free will and free choice of those who live 
under them. A people creates a constitution that reflects the political will of 
the generation that created it. But succeeding generations do not re-create 
the constitution anemr. On the contrary, they are in a sense themselves cre- 
ated by the existing constitution, inasmuch as the constitution and the insti- 
tutions it legitimizes function as a great school of civic instruction for the 
masses. Constitutional amendments may be approved, but a revolution in a 
constitution is much less frequent. By theit very nature and function, consti- 
tutions are on the whole conservative. Thus, seen in broader perspective, we 
should not attach undue weight to the idea that citizens are basically ex- 
cluded from the work of creating a constitution in an Islamic republic. There 
is no reason to think that constitutional politics in Islamic society has to take 
a radically different form or course of development from that common in 
other societies. 
Third, and most important, neither the office of Guardian Council, found 
in the Iranian Islamic constitution, nor the "sovereignty of the fuquha"' 
alluded to  by Abu-Zaid, are inevitable consequences of Islamic principles of 
government. Islamic teachings do not state that some body must have veto 
power over decisions of the legislative assembly. Islamic thinkers, in com- 
mon with ordinary Muslims, helieve that Islam does nor accept auy media- 
tion in the relationship between God and man. Enlighterled Muslims can 
and should be wary of ruling elites that aspire to have a monopoly of politi- 
cal power in the name of religion. It is possible, within the bounds of Islam, 
to conceive of a situation where all believe themselves to  be legitimate inter- 
preters of the faith and where all helieve that disagreements over questions 
of interpretation ought to be resolved by putting them to a vote. 
Of course, this idea is not likely to be well received by classes of the 
fuqaha', 'ulemu, or other religious "experts," who often have a vested inter- 
est in being viewed as guardians and interpreters of the faith. This is not 
surprising and can be dealt with in conceptual terms. At most, it calls for a 
Protestant-like reformation within Islamic society-a transformation that 
some believe is sorely needed. In other words, the concept of divine sover- 
eignty, suitably interpreted, need not pose a threat to the notion of popular 
sovereignty. It simply means "rule in accordance with Islamic principles." As 
long as these principles are freely chosen by the people and applied in a way 
that does not infringe upon familiar democratic procedures, no oue has 
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reason to call into question the logical coherence of the idea of Islamic de- 
m ~ c r a c y . ~  
Diversity andToleration 
Another set of difficulties, less philosophical and more pressing, sprlngs 
from diversity (cultural, religious, and other), an established fact in most 
societies. Democracy in ideal terms is supposed to be tolerant, even protec- 
tive, of pluralism and diversity. Democracy guarantees individual r i ~ h t s  and 
liberties for all, regardless of religion, gender, political persuasiou, and so on. 
Minority status is an acceptable situation in a democracy because the system 
is geared toward protection of individual rights and liberties, regardless of 
the size of the minority. Can an Islamic polity be trusted to grant and to 
protect the rights of "orhers," even when they consritute a small minority in 
society? If not, what does this portend for "Islamic democracy"? 
The approaches Islamic thinkers may take in addressing the issnes of 
pluralism and tolerance are manifold. Take the question of toleration: it is 
clearly an unresolved problem for all political systems and theories. Bernard 
Williams iinderlines rhat problem: 
The difficnlty with toleration is that it seems to be at once necessary 
and impossible. It is necessary where different groups have conflicting 
beliefs-moral, political, or religious-and realize that there is no al- 
ternative to their living together. . . Yet in those same circumstances it 
may u~ell seemimpossible. . . In matters of religion, for instance.. . the 
need for toleration arises became one of the groups, at least, thinks 
that the other is blasphemously, disastrously, obscenely wrong. . . .We 
need to tolerate other people and their ways of life only in situations 
that make it very difficult to do so. Toleration, we may say, is reqnircd 
only for the intolerable. That is its basic problem. (Williams 1996: 18) 
It is thns not surprising to find that toleration continues to be a potential 
sonrce of embarrassment for various (otherwise plansible) conceptions of 
democracy. Consider the Rawlsian version of democratic theory, that is, 
"political liberalism." According to Rawls: "Political liberalism also sup- 
poses that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine does not reject the essentials 
of a democratic regime. Of course, a society may also contain unreasonable 
and irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines. In their case, the 
problem is to contain them so that they do not undermine the unity and 
justice of society" (Rawls 1993: xix). 
Liberal democracy is snpposed to be tolerant, but, argnes Rawls, even 
liberal democracy has its limits. Unreasonable views, those that are "mad" 
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ot "irrational," must be "contained." Presumably containment is not the 
same as toleration; it is more aggressive. Yet what if we are unable to agree 
on what to categorize as "irrational," on how to define "madness"? Does 
this not mean that the question of what to tolerate and what to "contain" 
will always be an open, unresolved problem for us? 
Islamic thinkers face difficult, even perplexing, questions with respect to 
the toleration of diversity. Yet they differ little from other views, Rawls's 
included. In fact, it is noteworthy that al-Ghamouchi espouses a view similar 
to Rawls's notion of "containment" when it comes to ideas al-Ghannouchi 
considers "beyond the pale." Satisfied that there is a society-wide consensus 
on a basic Islamic constitution, al-Ghannouchi is able to accept the contin- 
ued existence and operation of non-Islamic (perhaps even un-Islamic) par- 
ties and groups within an Islamic polity. In his analysis, such groups and 
movements will be largely marginal and ineffective because they are not part 
of mainstream Islamic tendencies. "Civil society," says al-Gha~ouchi ,  "will 
see to it that such groups will be matginal. There will be no need to resort to 
state power [in order to "contain" them]" (al-Ghannouchi 1993: 295). 
The above-mentioned considerations constitute one approach available 
in Islamic democratic thinking for dealing with the difficulty posed by the 
question of diversity and toleration of difference. Toleration has limits. In 
every society, in every political system, toleration has a "ceiling." Its height 
varies depending on the type of measurement we use, as well as our expec- 
tations as to how high the ceiling must be if the "house" is to be fit for 
human habitation. Subjective, culturally relative judgments will abound 
here, and, short of universally accepted criteria of validity (which experience 
has shown to be nonexistent), there is no way to resolve disagreements. 
Another quite different tack that Islamic writers could follow would be to 
point out that Islam is not monolithic: it does not mean the same things to all 
advocates of the Islamic state. Some are hostile to the very idea of speaking 
of Islam and democracy in the same breath. And those who lean toward 
Islamic democracy may also differ in their degree of conservatism or liberal- 
ism. 
A remarkable case in point is the Sudanese thinker Abdullahi an-Na'im, 
whose approach to ethics and whose daring views on interpreting shari'a are 
reminiscent of Mu'tazilism at its best. (Mu'tazilism is an Islamic rationalist 
school of theology; they emphasized the use of reason in the interpretation 
of religious texts.) An-Na'im accepts all the noncontroversial rights that 
shari'a offers, such as the right to life, dignity, privacy, and property,"' but he 
pushes the frontiers of reform much further, to the extent of seeking to bring 
Islamic legislation into full conformity with international human rights stan- 
dards. His understanding of Islam requires the official abrogation of slavery, 
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complete freedom of belief (including freedom to change one's religion), and 
abolition of all forms of discr~mination on the basis of gender (An-Na'im 
1990: 179). 
In sum, when we say that Islam and democracy are compatible, we mean 
Islam in some interpretation thereof. Until it is shown that Islam, in each and 
every possible interpretation, is incapable of displaying tolerance toward 
those who are different, we have no reason to believe that Islam is intolerant 
of diversity and pluralism in some monolithic essentialist sense. In short, the 
issue of tolerance need not be the fatal flaw it is often taken to be as far as 
Islamic government is concerned. 
In connection with the problem of toleration of diversity, there is a kind 
of last-ditch strategy that Islamic thinkers may resort to when they feel they 
are at the end of their tether as far as the possibilities of compromise and 
accommodation are concerned. Imagine a society where Muslims constitute 
a politically active majority (whether an overwhelming or a small majority) 
that wants to institute an Islamic state. Suppose, furthermore, that despite 
all attempts, members of the society are unable to reach agreement on an 
Islamic constitution that is acceptable to all, Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike. What is to be done then? The available solutions are limited. 
First, there is the secularist solution, which is to remove religion from 
politics. Bnt contrary to all initial appearances, this has little or no justifica- 
tion from a democratic point of view. For it is bard to think that democracy 
requires that the majority lead a double life, almost bordering on the schizo- 
phrenic: at home youcan be religious and you can believe that religion is the 
most important thing in the world, hut nut on the street you must hide your 
religion and pretend that religion does not really matter in the public sphere 
or civil society. 
Fnrthermore, some religions think it is the epitome of itreligion to live 
your life in this manner. It is a mistake to think that all religions are like 
Christianity in being able to separate Caesar's kingdom from that of God. 
Islam, in particular, may be unable to condone this type of divide between 
belief and life in society. 
Another choice would he to force the minority to lead a life whose pattern 
is dictated by the Muslim majority. This could engender a sitnation where 
Islamic penalties are to be universally applied in a country that has a Chris- 
tian or other non-Islamic minority. Again, this does not accord with democ- 
racy, for the latter cannot accept the idea of people being ruled by a consti- 
tution to which they are fundamentally opposed. 
Is there a way out of the situation where disagreements cannot be ended 
except by loss of constitutive identity for one or more party? This is a situ- 
ation where it seems impossible to agree on a common definition of citizen- 
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ship. Walzer examines such a siruation in the context of his discussion of the 
collective right that a group exercises with respect to membership: "If a 
community is so radically divided that a single citizenship is impossible, then 
its territory must be divided, too, before the rights of admission and exclu- 
sion can be exercised. For these rights are to be exercised only by the com- 
munity as a whole . . . and only with regard to foreigners, not by some 
members with regard to others. No community can be half-metic, half-citi- 
Zen and claim that its admissions policies are acts of self-determination, or 
that its politics is democratic" (Walzer 1995: 62). 
Put "half-dhimmi, half-Muslim" in place of Walzer's "half-metic, half- 
citizen," and you have, in a nutshell, the problem of Islamic political com- 
munities that insist on treating individuals of different faiths as "protected 
citizens" (dhimmi) with diminished political rights. Such politics cannot be 
democratic. The only way to restore democracy, in line with Walzer's sugges- 
tion, is to allow for political separation and the attendant division of terri- 
tory. Of course, it may be difficult or even impossible to redraw borders and 
boundaries, especially when communities are intermingled and have been so 
over generations in the same area. Nonetheless, partition and redivision of 
territory are sometimes practicable. These options are still feasible, depend- 
ing on circumstances, albeit at times at a high social price, and not always in 
the name of a filller democratic way of life. Yet such solutions are a measure 
of last resort. Specific circumstances may require looking for othec more 
innovative options. 
So I have put forward three types of considerations to explore for a more 
adequate perspective on the possibilities of diversity and toleration within 
an Islamic polity. These considerations are obvionsly diverse, yet by present- 
ing them iu this manner, our primary aim has been to cast doubt on the naive 
supposition that the Islamic regime is bound to be undemocratic due to the 
intolerauce it entails for those who are "different." 
Conclusion 
Some continue to think that the Islamic conception of dernocracy is unviable 
because it seeks to divorce the democratic procedure from some of the basic 
values and philosophical beliefs historicaIly associated with it in the West. 
The fact that Islamic democracy has not been established in most Islamic 
countries lends further support to the idea that "Islamic democracy" is im- 
plausible. 
But this harsh judgment is not justified by the hard empirical facts of 
democracy. The distinctions within contemporary democratic theory be- 
nveen substance and form, method and aim, procedures and result have all 
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been made by Western thinkers. Islamic thinkers recognize the value of the 
pruccdure, but  they refuse t o  embrace Western values and definitions of the 
meaning of life that  have sprung and  evolved from specifically Western so-  
cial revolutions. Until i t  is demonstrated tha t  secularism, lihrralisrn, and 
relativism derive f rom the very notion of "government of the people, by the 
people, and for the people," we cannot dismiss the conceptual possibility of 
Islamic democracy. 
Notes 
1. Some of the ideas expressed in this chaptet have appeared elsewhere (Bahlul 
ZOOOa, 2000h). I would like to thank the publishers for permiss~on to quote passages 
from these works. My thanks also to  John Bun$ (Vienna) and Bill Tcrnplcr (Shumen, 
Bulgaria) for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. 
2. "Essentially contested" means there are disp,ltes nbour the use of the term in 
question. Difierent (suggested or actual) uses are susrained by "perfectly respectable 
arguments and evidence" that nevertheless fall shorr of settling the dispnte abont the 
use of the term. Srr W R. Gallie 1964: 14. 
3. The missing premise here, of course, is the idea that freedom of thought cannot 
be ensured in a nonsecular society. 
1. Rawls's solution is to give "citizens of faith" (believers in rel~gion) a double 
identity Qua political persons, individuals recognize a highest interest in antonomy 
and individnality. Qua private persons, there is no call tor them to separate them 
selves from thcir endnriug religious anachmenrs, loyalties, or self-definition. For a 
discussion of some problems that Rawls's view may havs, see Kymlicka 1996: 9 1-95. 
5. There is a trivlal exception to this, o i  course. Democracy canuot self-consis- 
tcmly allow the violarion of democrar~c procedures. 
6. I have discussed this difficulty in greater detail in Bahlul2000a and 2000b. 
7. By "whar political decisions ought to be like" we mean to refer to the quality 
(contenr) of the polit~cal decisions that are taken, as opposed to the method by which 
they are raken. This is a "corrsctness theory" oilegirimacy. It is a member oi a family 
of theories that Estlund refers to as "epistemic theories of democratic legitimacy," 
which are united in rheir rejecrion of the assimilation of validity (rightness) of deci- 
sions to the method iprocednres) used to reach them, see Estlund 1997: 174. 
8. Ayyubi remarks that "[The Islamisrs] arr thr~s after a kind of 'nornocracy,' not 
the reign of any pamcular gronp in particular (democracy, aristocracy or, for that 
marter, rheocracy)." See Ayyubi 1991: 218. 
9. Of course, outsidr ohs~rverr may disagree with the principles and values of the 
Islan~ic "consrirurion." We have not said anything to rule out the possibility of their 
being right in their rejecrion of such a constirution. But this is a discnssion of an 
rnrirrly different type from thc  one wc are engaged in. We are not ansmpting to 
prove either the truth or falsity of Islam, liberalism, or any other doctrine. Our only 
concern is the possibility of applying democratic procedures within the constiru- 
rional frameworks supplird by lhese doctrines. 
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10. See Mawdudi (1987: 27-31) for a catalogue of the individual rights that, in 
his view, are guaranteed by shari'a. Regardless of the strength of his arguments, 
Mawdudi is not at a loss to cite Qur'anic verses to support his view. 
References 
Abu-Zaid, Nasr Hamid. N q d  al-Khitob a/-Diniy (A cr~tique of religious discourse). 
Cairo: Sina lil-Nashq 1994. 
Audi, Robert. "Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics." In Religion 
in the Public Square: The Placp of Religious Conliictions 62 Political Debate, ed. 
R. Audi and N. Wolterstorff. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
1997. 
Ayyubi, Nazih. Political Islam: Religion and Politics in tlx Arab World. London: 
Routledge, 1991. 
al-Azmeh, Aziz. "Populism contra Democracy: Recent Democratist Discourse in the 
Arab World." In Democracy toithout Democrats? The Renewal of Polirics in the 
iMuslim World, ed. Ghassan Salame. London: I. B. Tautis, 1994. 
Bahlul, Raia. Hukw Allah, Hukm al-Sha'b: Hauila al-Alaqah baina al~Dimoqratiy- 
yah wa-'limaniyyah (Popular sovereignty, diviue sovereignty: On the relation 
between democracy and secularism). Amman: Dar al-Shurouq, 2000. (2000a) 
"People vs. God: The Logic of 'Divine Sovereignty' in Islan~ic Denlocratic 
Discourse." Islam and Muslinr-Christian Relations 11, no. 3 (2000): 287-98. 
(2000b) 
Bishara, Azmi. "Madkhal li-Mu'alajat al-Demoqratiyya wu-Anmat at-Tadayyun" 
(Democracy and modes of religiosity). In Hawla al-Khiyar al-De,rroqrati (On the 
democratic alternative), ed. Burhan Ghalyun et al. Ramallah: Muwatin, 1993. 
al-Bishri, Tariq. Al-Wad'u a[-Qanzmi baina a/-Shari'a al-lslamiyya Iua al-Qanun al- 
Wad'i (The legal situation in relation to Islamic shari'a and positive law). Cairo: 
Dar al-Shuruq, 1996. 
Blaustein, Albert, and Gisbert Flanz, eds. Constitutions of the World. Dobbs Ferry, 
N.Y.: Oceana, 1986. 
Dahl, Robert. De,nocmcy and its Critics. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
1989. 
Espos~to, John L., and John 0 .  Voll. Islam avdDetnocracy Oxford: Oxford Univer- 
sity Press, 1996. 
Estlund, David. "Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: 'The Epirtemic Dimension of 
Democratic Authority." In Deliberatirie Democracy: Essays orr Reason and Poli- 
tics, ed. James Bohman and William Rehq. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997. 
Gallic, W. B. P l~ i losop l~~  and the Historical linderstauding. London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1964. 
al-Ghannouchi, Rachid. AI-Hurriynt al-'Aninin/, fi al-Dadah al-lslamiyyah (Public 
liberties in the Islamic state). Beinlr: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihdah al-Atabiyyah, 
1993. 
Democracy without Secularism? 1 117 
-. Muyarabat f i  al-'llnzaniyyuh 7ua a/-Mujtarna' al-Madani (Approaches to 
secularism and civil society). London: Magharehi Center for Research and Trans- 
lation. 1999. 
Kedourie, Elie. Democracy arzd Ar.nh Political Culture. London: Fr,anli Cassand Co., 
1994. 
Khatami, hqnharnrnad. Mzrtala'at /i al~Dirt wal-l5lum u ,o l - 'As~  (Readings 111 religion, 
Islam and the age). Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1998. 
Kymlicka, Will. "Two Models of Pluralmn and Tolerance." In Toleration: An Elu- 
sive Virtue, ed. David Heyd. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
Mawdudi, Abu AI-A'la. Tadwin al-Uzrstoor al-Islami. Mu'assat al-Risalah, [n.p.], 
1975. 
-. A/-Khrlafah ma al-Mulk (Caliphate and kingship). Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam, 
1987. 
Mayrr, Ann Elizabeth. Islam and Haman Rights. Boulder, Cola.: Westview Press, 
1991. 
An-Na'im, hbdullahi Ahmnd. Totuardan islami< Reformation: CiuiI Liberties, Hu- 
man Rights, and Intertzntionnl Law. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University I'ress, 
1990. 
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columb~a University Press, 1993. 
Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper and 
Row, 1976. 
Turabi, Hasan. Qadoya a-Hurriyyah u'a al~Wihdah uba a/-Sbura &,a al-nirno- 
qrdriyyab (Questions o f  freedom, unity, consultarion, and democracy]. Al~Dar al- 
Su'udiyyoh lil-Nashr, 1987. 
Islam, Democracy, the State, and the West: 4 Roundtable u'ith Dr. Hason 
Z.wabi, ed. A. Lowrie. Tampa, Fla.: World of Islpm Studies Enterprise, 1993. 
Walzer. Michael. Spheres oflustice: A Defense of plural is,^^ and Eqrraliiy. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995. 
Williams, Bernard. "Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?" In Toleration: An Elusive 
Virtue, ed. David Heyd. Princctoli, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
